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COLONIAL ASPECTS OF THE WAR 
In a recent speech Mr. Asquith declared that the greatest 
mistake that Germany had made in respect to the war was in her 
failure to recognize that there was a British Empire. Great 
Britain has long been regarded as a small, insignificant island 
off the European coast. She has been looked upon as a second-
rate European power somewhat in the class with Italy and Spain. 
And such she is in fact if considered by herself alone. But the 
war has revealed, what the Empire has long since known, that 
England is an imperial rather than a European nation, that she 
is but the heart of a group of free autonomous states, that her 
strength lies not alone in her own people and resources, but in 
the loyal support of her children and children's children through-
out the seven seas, 
But this insular conception of England is not the mistake of 
Germany alone. It has been shared by the public in all the 
American and European states. It has been taught in our schools 
and universities; it has been accepted by the chancelleries of 
Europe. Pick up the first geography which comes to hand and 
what do you find? Other countries are studied as political units; 
the British Empire, on the contrary, is treated as a philosophic 
. abstraction. France we know, Germany we kIiow, England we 
know; but the Empire, that vast aggregation of outlying terri-
tories and dependencies, we know not or but faintly understand 
through the association of its parts with some other state or 
continent. Canada is a misplaced portion of the British Empire, 
closely attached to the northern boundary of the United States. 
Australia is a long-lost island in the South Pacific. India is the 
distant seat of a great Asiatic civilization. But nowhere in our 
histories, geographies, or public documents do we find a British 
Empire. It is like the English constitution; it does not exist. 
This misconception of the Empire enters into almost all our 
ideas of international relations and policies. Turn, for example, 
to the vast array of statistics prepared by our Department of 
Commerce and Labour. There we shall find comparative tables 
of the population, revenue, imports, and exports of all the leading 
countries of the world. But the statistics for England are set 
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off against the figures for other countries. India and the se1f-
governing colonies are treated as independent states. But how 
misleading must be the conclusions in respect to the wealth and 
resources of the Empire when based upon such misleading data! 
Let us glance for a moment at the growth of foreign trade by 
way of illustration. To those of the public who are accustomed 
to look upon England as an ancient and somewhat decadent 
state, it may come as a surprise to learn that during the past five 
years her import and export trade has developed more rapidly 
than that of any European country. And if the trade of the 
whole Empire is taken into consideration, the statistics are even 
more surprising, for it will be found that that trade has not only 
greatly exceeded in amount the foreign commerce of any other 
nation, but has also grown almost twice as rapidly as that of 
Germany, the most prosperous of the European states. To 
convert the matter into figures: the foreign trade of the Empire 
has increased by approximately £625,000,000 since 1908, and at 
the close of the last fiscal year reached the stupendous total of 
£2,648,537,000. These fignres lend small support to the theory 
of a decadent England or of a moribund Empire. It is only too 
true that the commerce of England cannot hope to expand in the 
future at the same rapid rate as in the past, but the trade of the 
Empire of which England is oolyone of the component members, 
is destined to surpass even the fabled wealth of Ormuz and of the 
distant East. 
A hasty examination of the relative strength of the British 
army and navy will afford us an even more interesting basis of 
comparison. We in the United States are accustomed to point 
to our small but efficient military force as the most convincing 
proof of the peaceful character of our foreign policy. And such 
in fact it is. The 250,000 men of the British standing army look 
like a formidable force for the tight little island; but if that army 
is considered, as it ought to be considered, as an imperial force 
for the defence of the vast possessions of the British Crown, it 
appears in its true light as little more than a large police force. 
It is in fact not any larger proportionately than the army of the 
United States and insignificant in comparison with the mighty 
hosts of Europe. The British navy affords us an even better 
illustration of our provincial misconceptions. The huge pre-
ponderance of that navy has long been regarded as a danger to all 
other states. Its size seems to be altogether out of comparison 
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with the economic and political needs of the country. And yet 
if it is distinctly understood that that navy is an imperial navy, 
the connecting link or arterial system of the whole British Empire, 
it will be seen that it is not so formidable as might at first appear. 
It is, in reality, relatively smaller than the American, French, 
or German navies. If the British navy, for example, were placed 
on the same population basis as the German navy, the ratio of 
strength between the two fleets would not be the present stand-
ard of ten to six, but of approximately four to one. In view of 
these facts it is somewhat difficult to believe that the British 
Government has set the pace in the senseless race of naval and 
military armaments. 
It is time that the public enlarged its outlook and commenced 
to think imperially. There is, in fact, a British Empire, a huge, 
unwieldy agglomeration of territory and people monopolizing 
about one-fifth of the earth's surface and commanding the 
allegiance of about one-fourth of its inhabitants. It is the 
greatest hotchpotch under the sun, a nondescript collection of 
English, Irish, Scotch, Indians, Canadians, Australians, Fiji, 
Malays, Zulus, and Fuzzy W uzzies of all ranks and conditions of 
men, of all races and religious creeds, of all gradations of barbar-
ism and civilization. The British Empire is running a certain 
American manufacturer a close race for the lead in the variety 
of the products it can turn out and every race as every product 
with a distinctive flavour of its own. Yet here it is, a vaster Em-
pire than has been, territorially the most sporadic, socially the 
most irreconcilable, constitutionally the weakest, yet politically 
one of the strongest of modern governments. The Empire is in 
truth the greatest contribution that England has made to the 
science and art of government. 
But great as has been the misconception as to the existence of 
the Empire, still greater has been the mistake in regard to its real 
character. It has been represented as a colossal sham, as an 
Oriental despotism, living upon the spoils of its subject races. 
Day after day we have been assured by a portion of the press 
that on the first defeat the Empire would fall asunder, that the 
colonies would rise and throw off the yoke of their oppressors. 
The dispatch of the colonial troops to the front has been inter-
preted as an evidence of English weakness and tyranny; it has 
been condemned as a betrayal of the civilization of Europe. But 
how different have been the results from those anticipated by the 
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outside world. Prior to the outbreak of war the Empire was 
indeed in deep commotion from Ulster to India; but on the 
declaration of war political discontents were largely stilled, 
economic and racial differences were almost forgotten. In the 
face of foreign danger all the colonies and dependencies have 
promptly rallied to the support of the mother land. At once the 
war became more than a racial issue between the Slavs and the 
Teutons, more than a continental struggle between allied states, 
more than an international issue over the neutrality of Belgium 
and the moral obligation of treaties; it became, in fact, a great 
imperial conflict in which the very principles of colonial govern-
ment were at stake. 
But the question arises how can we account for this anomalous 
Empire, this apparent anachronism in an age of intense national-
ism. To a large extent it is the product of English political 
traditions. The British constitution has been built up on the 
twofold principle of personal and political liberty. The English-
man is essentially an individualist. The long course of English 
history is a record of his struggles against arbitrary government. 
He has worked out his own salvation by his own efforts. He has 
developed his own civilization, and in so doing has gained that 
strength and self-sufficiency which the possession of immemorial 
rights alone can afford. He does not look to the government 
for the protection of his liberty; he looks after that for himself. 
The very isolation of England has made this characteristic more 
pronounced. To this exaggerated individualism is largely due 
the general unpopularity of Englishmen. We have all suffered 
at some time or other from a certain condescension on the part 
of nameless foreigners. As Thackeray has wittily observed, the 
Englishman is the most objectionable of all travellers because he 
. will insist upon treating the inhabitants of the country in which 
he is as though they were foreigners. The Englishman usually 
succeeds in giving to his national pretensions a certain personal 
~. character. And this it is that chiefly grates On our sensibilities. 
I Wecan readily overlook a claim to national superiority, but we i are scarcely prepared to admit a personal inferiority on our part. 
I True, the Englishman does not positively assert such individual 
, superiority; but what is much more annoying, he calmly assumes 
I it, and that settles the matter so far as he is concerned . . ' But in this very quality is to be found the secret of English t colonization. It is the individualist, the self-reliant man, who is 
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the successful pioneer. He does not need nor desire the eternal 
supervision of the government; he is prepared to go out and face 
the world alone. The history of all the self-governing colonies 
is a history of individual efforts and achievement. The colonies 
have worked out their own social problems. They have thrived 
most when left to themselves. And what has been true in the 
autonomous colonies has been equally true in the less favoured 
dependencies of the Crown. The great proconsuls of the British 
Empire are the supreme example of triumphant individualism. 
It is the character of the individual Englishman, said the late 
Count Ito, not the army or navy, that makes the British Empire 
what it is. His calm self-possession is the source of his authority. 
He is born to the purple; he rules by the force of his own person-
ality. He is assured of his own position; he holds himself responsi-
ble to his own conscience. He is sometimes stupid and often 
arrogant and self-willed; but he has a high sense of duty, a keen 
sense of justice, and an unswerving resolution to carry through 
whatever is committed to his care. Into the hands of such men 
England has entrusted the governance of her possessions. And 
but seldom have they betrayed her trust. 
The very individualism of the English people has taught them 
to respect the rights of others. Every revolution in English 
history has been a compromise. The rights and privileges of the 
contending parties have been habitually preserved. The princi-
ple of liberty has found expression in the protection of the rights 
of minorities. To live and let live has been the political motto of 
English statesmen and people. No other nation has been so 
insistent upon the maintenance of its own peculiar usages and 
institutions, yet none has been so careful to recognize the laws 
and customs of foreign people. The policy of the government 
has often been cruel, selfish, and hypocritical; and yet there is 
but one case in English history where the government has 
systematically striven to Anglicize another race, and that is the 
case of Ireland. The recent adoption of the Home Rule Bill is 
an attempt to make amends for that injustice; it is a return to the 
historic principles of national liberalism. It is to the credit of 
English imperialism that it has tried to preserve the national 
life and institutions of all the subjects of the Empire. Strongly 
as the English Government believes in the superiority of its own 
civilization, gladly as it would see its institutions adopted through-
out the Empire, it has not sought after an artificial uniformity or 
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endeavoured to compel its citizens or subjects to accept a sup-
posedly higher and better civilization. The armies of England 
have overrun a large part of the world, but they have come 
not to destroy but to fulfil. In the province of Quebec to-day 
the langnage, religion, and laws of the inhabitants are French; 
in South Mrica they are Dutch; in India the Hindus and the 
Mohammedans retain their own social and religious institutions; 
and so on throughout the Empire. The Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council is called upon to interpret and apply not only 
the common law of England but also the tribal usages of the 
Maori, Hottentots, Bornians, and many similar races. 
It is this combination of the qUalities of personal indepen-
dence with the recognition of the principles of social and political 
liberty which makes the British Empire what it is. It is tbe 
secret of England's successful colonial policy. There is no love 
lost between the English, Scotch, and Irish; the relationship 
between the cockney and the colonial is scarcely that of the 
David and Jonathan type; the Hindu and the Anglo-Saxon are 
strangers to one another, for the "East is East and the W es t is 
West and never the twain shall meet, till earth and sky stand 
presently at God's great judgment seat." The relations of 
various parts of the Empire are often strained, yet these differ-
ences are essentially of the Irish domestic variety in which it is 
safer for the outsider not to interfere. The very variety of its 
life is the source of its unity; the very diversity of its organization 
the secret of its strength. The Empire is powerful because it is 
free. Throughout its length and breadth there is a sense of 
personal security, a certainty of justice and an assurance of 
political freedom that cannot be found elsewhere. The political 
faith of the Empire, like that of the Christian church, transcends 
all considerations of race, language, religion, nationality, and 
civilization. Its loyalty is a devotion to a political ideal, an 
ideal of freedom. In short the British Empire is the most liberal-
minded of all democracies, in that it expresses the highest faith 
in humanity itself. The English constitution makes no distinc-
tion in respect to race, colour, or previous condition of servitude. 
It goes even farther than that of the United States in conferring 
full citizenship on all persons within its jurisdiction. There 
are no outlanders within the British Empire. The Zulu and 
Fiji, unlike the Filipino, are legally qualified to hold any office 
under the Crown from the pettiest municipal post up to the 
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Premiership of Great Britain. That this right is not a mere 
theoretical right is evidenced by the presence of large numbers 
of colonists in the imperial service. To the colonial has been 
entrusted an ever increasing share in the government of the 
Empire. 
In short, the superior civilization of the Englishman confers 
on him no special privileges; nor does it warrant him, according 
to the principles of English liberalism, in forcing his brand of 
civilization upon other races within the Empire. It was not 
without cause that the old English law laid down the rule that 
a man ought not to be judge in his own case. And which among 
the nations is placed above this principle of equity; which of 
them can forecast the future or rightly determine its own place 
or that of any other nation in history? It is, indeed, a dangerous 
thing to crush or destroy the soul of a nation. For this reason 
alone, if for no other, the policy of imperial expansion can be 
justified only in as far as it recognizes and respects the culture of 
subject races. It has been the glory of British imperialism that 
it has appealed to the national conscionsness of the colonies and 
dependencies, that it has encouraged them to seek after a higher 
and more independent status, and that in as far as they have 
shown political capacity it has conferred upon them the full rights 
and privileges of self-government. Thanks to this liberal policy, 
the government of the British Empire is gradually being trans-
formed into a great federation of free and autonomous states. 
The history and spirit of German nationalism is fundamentally 
different. Germany is the cradle of a great civilization. Within 
her borders art, music, science, literature, and philosophy have 
found their highest expression. These have been her greatest 
gifts to humanity. She has accomplished in the higher realm of 
thought and feeling what England has in the lower world of 
politics-a true mastery of the souls of men. The civilization 
of Germany can boast a noble and ancient lineage. But Ger-
many as a nation is a decidedly modern power. She can look 
back to a bare half century of national life. At a time when 
England and France had long since attained to full national 
consciousness and were fighting out their political differences in 
India and America, Germany was a backward, semi-feudal 
state. True, she had already attained to intellectual pre-eminence, 
but her greatest thinkers gave themselves over to the considera-
tion of philosophical rather than political questions. The satire 
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of Voltaire was only too true; France ruled the land, England 
the sea, ;l.nd Germany the clouds. 
The creation of a united Germany was not, as in England, the 
resnlt of a long historical struggle on the part of the people; it 
was rather the sudden emergence of an ancient civilization under 
the genius of a few great statesmen. It was the product of 
autocracy, not of democracy; of blood and iron, not of constitu-
tional agitation. Germany had won her way in tbe world by her 
own heroic efforts. She was conscious of her own mission in life. 
From the very outset she demanded and properly demanded her 
rightful place among the world's great powers. But she did 
not receive the generous welcome that she had hoped for. 
England, in particular, was inclined to look upon the newcomer 
as a parvenu, a political upstart in an old established society. 
Germany very naturally objected to such cavalier treatment. 
She was intensely proud of her new nationality and she soon 
made England realize that fact. The long period of German 
humiliation was over. German civilization had at last come to 
frnition; it had attained a national life of its own. For the future 
the development of German culture was identified with the 
progress of the German state. 
But in this very identification there lurked a danger. The 
sacrifice of individual liberty to the demands of high state policy 
is ouly a part of the price of German nationalism. What is even 
more significant for our purpose is the exaltation of German 
civilization at the expense of lesser races and people. In the 
mind of the nation at large the maintenance and extension of Ger-
man culture is inseparably bound up with the ascendency of the 
Teutonic race. This conception is, perhaps, best set forth in the 
well-known declaration of Treitschke, "that just as the greatness 
of Germany is to be found in the government of Germany by 
Prussia, so the greatness and good of the world is to be found in 
the predominance there of German culture, of the German mind-
in a word, of the German character." Herein may be seen the 
dominant idea of Roman imperialism, the idea of a superior 
world-civilization. Germany has succeeded, in theory at least, 
through the Holy Roman Empire, to the place and traditions of 
ancient Rome. She has inherited the splendid ideals of Roman 
culture and organization, of the supreme but beneficent rule of 
a superior race. In this imperial conception there is no room for a 
competing civilization. Herein is to be found the justification of 
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the efforts of the German Government to proscribe the language, 
expropriate the land, and suppress the political agitation of the 
recalcitrant inhabitants of Posen and Alsace-Ldrraine. It is 
a policy of compulsory assimilation. The justification of the 
present war rests upon the same sure foundation. By reason of 
her situation in the centre of the armed camp of Europe, Germany 
is obliged to take the strongest measures for the preservation of 
all that is nearest and dearest to her. Her very existence appa-
rently is at stake; and necessity knows no law but the primitive 
law of force. Under these circumstances it is little wonder that 
the political and intellectual leaders of the country have laid 
down the principle that the national aspirations of an alien race, 
however justifiable they may be in themselves, must needs give 
way to the paramount demands of a higher civilization. From 
this standpoint the European war is but one phase of the age-
long struggle for the survival of the fittest. In taking up the 
Slavic challenge, Germany is fighting not for her own interests 
alone but for the civilization of the world. But the very strength 
of this conviction bodes ill, in case of a German victory, for the 
vanquished party. 
The ideals of Germany are not, as many Englishmen would 
have us believe, those of material advantage or political ascend-
ency alone. These national aspirations are but another aspect 
of German idealism. They are a manifestation of the firm resolu-
tion of both rulers and people to live worthily of the high station 
whereunto they are called; they are an evidence of the same 
nobility of spirit that finds expression in the beauty and strength 
of a Wagnerian chorus. For the national ideals which Germany 
cherishes in her heart are those of a spiritual dominion. In the 
words of the late Professor Cramb: 
"Force alone, violence or brute strength by its more silent presence or by 
its loud manifestation in war may be necessary to establish this dominion; but 
its ends are spiritual. The triumph of the empire will be a triumph of German 
culture, of the German world-vision in all the phases and departments of human 
life and energy, in religion, poetry, science, art,politics,and social endeavour. 
The characteristics of this Gennan world-vision, the benefits which its predomi-
nance is likely to confer upon mankind are, a German would allege, truth 
instead of falsehood in the deepest and gravest preoccupations of the human 
mind." 
This supremacy of the German spirit has become almost a re-
ligious tenet of the German people. This is, indeed, the soul 
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of the Pan-Germanic movement. It has taken possession of the 
German heart with all the force of a master passion. These 
ideals constitute for them the supreme good not for Germany 
alone but for the world at large. 
Two conflicting ideals of government are thus brought face 
to face. The genius of the British nation has expressed itself in 
the form of political liberty ; the genius of the German people in 
the form of national culture. And between these two ideals 
there is a great gulf fixed, not of race but of tradition. The 
conflict is, in truth, a conflict of ideas rather than of nations. 
But it is time for me to turn from theoretical considerations to 
questions of practical politics. For after all it is the specific 
grievance rather than the political principle that sticks in men's 
minds and causes trouble. We must face the questions how has 
the colonial antagonism of Great Britain and Germany arisen, 
and what have been the chief points at issue? 
The three successful wars of Prussia against Denmark, Austria, 
and France gained for Germany a marked ascendency in Euro-
pean affairs. But Germany was not long satisfied to remain a 
continental power only. Political and economic considerations 
alike prompted her to aspire to a colonial domain. It had 
grieved the hearts of German patriots to see so much of the best 
blood of the country drained off to foreign lands, to see rival 
nations developing at her expense. It was small satisfaction to 
know that German civilization was making its influence felt 
throughout the world. The rapid industrial development of the 
Fatherland demanded new sources of raw material and new 
markets for manufactured products. The success of England's 
colonial policy appealed to the imagination of the German people. 
Why should Germany not enlarge her dominions and become 
a world-wide power? Had she not also an imperial tradition; 
and what other nation couId more rightfully claim a place in 
the sun? For" in the German race," as Bernharcli has said, 
"the instinct for empire is as ancient and as deep-rooted as it is 
in the English race; and in the Germany of the present time, 
above all, this instinct, by reason of the very strength of Ger-
many within herself, her conscious and vital energy. her sense 
of deep and repressed forces, is not a mere cloud of the brain, 
but is almost an imperious necessity." In the face of these 
demands, Bismarck at last gave way and consented somewhat 
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reluctantly to enter upon a policy of colonial expansion. But 
the object of such a policy was, he declared, purely commer-
cial, for the protection and promotion of German trade. This 
decision marks a new era in the history of Germany. She assumed 
her place among the world powers. 
The colonial aspirations of Germany, it must be admitted, 
were perfectly legitimate. It is doubtful whether any other 
state could put forward such strong claims for an extension of 
territory. Least of all could Great Britain, with her vast un-
developed areas, properly object to the enterprise of her neigh-
bour. But the practical question at once arose; admitting the 
right of expansion, where should Germany expand, what quarter 
of the globe should be considered open for occupation and settle-
ment? This was a political rather than a commercial question. 
The natural and most suitable region for colonization was to be 
found in the temperate zone of South America, where a consider-
able number of Germans had already established themselves in 
thriving communities. But unfortunately for Germany the 
Monroe Doctrine blocked the way. According to this well-
known doctrine, the American continent is expressly reserved 
for the American people. The European powers are generously 
allowed to encroach on one another's territory in all other por-
tions of the world, but they are distinctly informed that their 
presence is not desired on this side of the Atlantic no matter how 
high and exalted their civilization may be. Germany had no 
desire to question the validity of the traditional policy of the 
United States and wisely determined to seek other fields for 
colonization. Unluckily for England, the districts selected lay 
alongside some of the British colonies and in certain cases were 
regarded as falling within a British sphere of influence. To the 
Monroe Doctrine is thus due in a measure the colonial rivalries 
of Germany and Great Britain. 
In 1884 the German flag was hoisted over Angra Pequena on 
the southwest coast of Africa, in the face of the protest of the 
government of Cape Colony. The Australian colonies in turn 
were filled with alarm at the rumour of a German expedition to 
the neighbouring islands to the north of Torres Strait. The 
Queensland Government hastily took possession of a part of the 
island of New Guinea but the act of annexation was disavowed by 
the Colonial Office. In the hope of forestalling foreign aggression 
the Australian colonies united in formulating a Monroe Doctrine 
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of their own, in which they solemnly warned all foreign states 
to keep away from the Australian coast. At the same time New 
Zealand was begging the English Government to annex the 
Samoan Islands in order to prevent them from falling into the 
hands of a foreign state and being used as a naval base. The 
Australasians were qnite willing to reciprocate the courtesy of 
the United States by permitting the Germans to settle anywhere 
on the American continent provided that the Southern Pacific 
were left undisturbed. 
But Bismarck paid small heed to British colonial opinion. He 
knew the man with whom he had to deal. The British Foreign 
Office at this time was occupied by Lord Granville, an aristo-
cratic radical of the Manchester School. Bismarck knew there 
was nothing to fear. The colonies were weak and helpless. The 
English Government would not show fight; at most it would 
content itself with mild representations together with certain 
pious observations on the wisdom of respecting the rights of the 
natives. Accordingly Germany promptly raised her standard 
over several of the principal island groups of the Pacific and 
followed this up by the annexation of important areas in Mrica. 
By a sudden tour de jorce Germany had become a great colonial 
power. In pursuing this policy she had undoubtedly acted well 
within her legal rights, but in so doing she had sacrificed the good 
will of the British colonies. From the standpoint of inter-
national law her conduct was perfectly legitimate, but from the 
standpoint of international comity it was of doubtful expediency. 
It was, indeed, no small thing to outrage the sensibilities of a 
group of ambitious young colonies. A question commercial in its 
origin had been converted into a serious political issue. Bismarck 
had taught the colonies that their protests were useless, that the 
only language which Germany understood was the language of 
force. 
So far, it seems to me, Germany has a reasonably sound case 
against the colonies, notwithstanding their appeal to the principle 
of the Monroe Doctrine. In order to justify, however, an aggres-
sive colonial policy, it is not sufficient for a nation to demon-
strate its pre-eminent right to enlarge its territory; it must 
likewise show an aptitude for colonization in the case of settlement 
colonies or a capacity for administration in the case of possessions 
with a large native population. But a glance at the statistics 
of the German colonies will reveal that after thirty years of 
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propaganda the government has succeeded in inducing only 
about twenty thousand of its citizens to settle in the colonies. 
The host of German emigrants have preferred to seek the pro-
tection of any other flag rather than their own. And in respect 
of the government of native territories the German Colonial 
Office has made even a sorrier showing. From the very outset 
the government declined to learn anything from the experience of 
English colonization. It believed that its own scientific organiza-
tion and military efficiency were greatly superior to the rough 
and ready methods of English administration. So expensive, 
however, has been the bureaucratic regime in the German 
colonies that but one of these dependencies up to date has paid 
the full cost of administration. This is the penalty for the loss 
of political individualism, the price which the country has paid 
for the attempt to apply a rigid administrative system to the 
divergent conditions of distant territories. 
But there has been an even more serious defect in German 
colonial policy. The right of expansion carries with it as a 
necessary corollary a reciprocal responsibility as to tbe use to 
which the right is put. Permit me to use a homely illustration. 
As a private individual I have no right to object to any decent 
and respectable member of society acquiring a piece of property 
alongside my own, however personally objectionable the latter 
may be to me; but I can properly object to his using that land 
for purposes which are dangerous or deleterious to me. In other 
words, the right of acquisition is conditioned upon the property's 
being put to a social use. The same principle, it seems to me, 
shonld be equally applicable to the relations of states. The 
right of conquest or territorial sovereignty is not, as is sometimes 
assumed, an absolute and unqualified right; it is subject not 
only to "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind" but also 
to the moral obligation of respecting as far as possible the social 
and political institutions of friendly neighbouring states. Upon 
the recognition of this principle depends in fact the social progress 
of mankind. 
I can still remember distinctly my surprise when on ap-
pearing at my first lecture on Colonial Government at the 
University of Berlin, I saw a splendid group of young military 
officers in full uniform occupying all the front rows of the room, 
the mere civilian members of the class being seated very modestly 
some distance in the rear. In this little incident I saw clearly 
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revealed two of the most characteristic features of German 
society-the marked pre-eminence of the military class and the 
superior scientific training of all officers of state. At the same 
time there was brought home to me the equally significant fact 
that the Prossian military system was being introduced in full 
force throughout the German colonies. The administration of 
the German possessions was to be placed in the hands, not of 
civil officials, as is the case in the British and American colonies, 
but of military men whose ideas of government were almost 
necessarily those of the barracks and mess room. The divergent 
character of the political systems of the three great colonial 
powers now at war has been happily summed up in the statement 
that whenever England establishes a colony she sets up a customs 
house, Germany bnilds a fort, and France a road. The German 
colonies were doomed from the outset to an essentially autocratic 
r~me. From their very location within the tropics they were 
not suitable for settlement purposes; they could never become 
the actual or prospective home of thousands of the loyal sons and 
daughters of the Fatherland. They were, on the contrary, 
commercial prospects or military outposts for the protection of 
German interests in different parts of the world. That Germany 
was legally entitled to set up a military administration in her 
colonies cannot be questioned. It is inherent in the very nature 
of sovereignty that a state shall be free to choose its own form of 
government. But the question now at issue is not one of legality 
alone. The attempt of the English parliament to tax the Ameri-
can colonies has been rightly considered as one of the greatest 
crimes of history Yet from the constitutional standpoint the 
action of the English Government was perfectly valid. It is 
only when we consider the question from the higher standpoint 
of human liberty that the revolt of the American colonies is 
entirely justified. There is a higher court of appeal than to the 
throne of Cresar or to the decisions of a supreme court. The 
judgments of history are not juristic in character; they are based 
upon the eternal principles of justice and liberty. And it is to 
this higher test that Germany must submit her colonial policy. 
But the problem was even more serious in its international 
bearings. The policy of the German Colonial Office reacted 
powerfully on the British colonies. For many years the latter 
had been living in a state of happy isolation. They had been 
busy working out their own social and economic problems with 
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but a passing thought to the political complications of Europe. 
Now for the first time they found themselves face to face with a 
military danger. They had no direct interest in foreign politics 
and had no desire, as Sir Wilfrid Laurier said, "to be caught in 
the maelstrom of European militarism." But through no fault 
vf their own the menace was brought to their very shores. In-
stead of holding out to them the right hand of fellowship, Ger-
many had greeted them with the mailed fist. She had not only 
forced herself upon them as al< • .mwelcome neighbour, but had 
also proceeded to set up a military establishment incompatible 
with their political and social ideals. In the judgment of the 
colonies Germany had abused the rights of territorial sovereignty 
by endangering the peace of her neighbours. To them the 
dominion of Germany appeared in the light of a revival of the 
principles of Roman imperialism. 
The lesson was not lost on the British colonies. Probably no 
other factor has contributed so much to develop the spirit of 
colonial nationalism particularly in the Australasian colonies. 
From this time dates the movement for the organization of a 
distinct army and navy for the self-governing colonies. The 
latter were no longer content to rely upon the protection of the 
mother land, but proceeded to develop their own means of self-
defence. Germany sowed the wind; she has reaped the whirl-
wind in the loss of many of her colonies and in the dispatch of 
150,000 colonial troops to the battlefields of Europe. This is the 
colonial answer to General Bernhardi's declaration that the 
"colonies could be completely ignored so far as concerns any 
European theatre of war. tJ 
We must now turn to the fiscal aspect of the question. The 
adoption by England of the free-trade principles of the Manches-
ter School had a most important effect upon the commercial 
relations of the colonies with the mother land. The colonial leg-
islatures were now entrusted with the power of determining their 
own tariff policies according to their respective needs. But they 
were not entirely free to do as they wished. The government 
at Westminister no longer attempted to interfere with the fiscal 
schedules of the colonies, but it did indirectly place an important 
restriction upon their economic freedom through the exercise of 
the treaty-making power and the royal veto. There was still 
an imperial commercial policy; only its name and practice had 
been changed from protection to free trade. In furtherance of 
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this policy Great Britain had entered into commercial treaties 
with Belgium and the North German Bund under the terms of 
which the colonies were prohibited from levying discriminatory 
duties. On the advent of the Liberal party to power in Canada, 
Sir Wilfrid Laurier called upon the English Government to 
tenmnate these treaties with a view to the adoption of a policy 
of imperial preferential trade. The British Government acceded 
to the demand and formal notice of the tenmnation of the agree-
ment was soon after conveyed to Germany. Sir Wilfrid Laurier 
at once proceeded to put his policy into effect by granting a 25 
per cent. preference to Great Britain and most of the British 
colonies. This preferential policy opened up a new era in imperial 
politics. It was intended to give notice to the world at large of 
the growing sense of imperial unity. This policy was accepted 
by all the powers save one as a natural and legitimate expression 
of colonial loyalty. That one exception was Germany. She 
alone refused to treat the British Empire as a commercial unit 
and demanded that she should be put upon a fiscal equality with 
the mother land in the Canadian market upon pain of levying 
retaliatory duties. Sir Wilfrid Laurier refused to back down, 
whereupon the German Government promptly imposed counter-
vailing duties and Canada retaliated in turn. A sharp tariff 
war ensued. England declined to interfere but the other se1£-
governing colonies took up the challenge and ranged themselves 
by the side of the Dominion. Germany got the worst of the 
petty fiscal squabble and at last agreed to withdraw her discrimi-
nating duties and accept the policy of imperial preferential trade. 
In taking such drastic measures Germany had acted well 
within her rights. She was entitled to treat the British se1£-
governing colonies as fiscally independent, for such in fact they 
were; but it was none the less inexpedient for her to do so in 
view of the intensity of colonial feeling in the matter. On a 
previous occasion she had appeared to challenge the principle of 
colonial nationalism; she now appeared to attack the ideal of 
imperial unity. The colonies could not overlook the fact that 
the British colonies alone had been singled out for attack whereas 
the preferential policies of other nations including France and the 
United States had been accepted by the German Government 
without question, and apparently without thought of retaliation. 
Throughout all these early controversies Great Britain had 
remained a passive spectator. She had left the colonies to fight 
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their own battles. So far as she had ventured to interfere it was 
rather with a view to modify than to support the pretensions of 
the colonies. The present anti-German feeling throughout the 
British Empire did not arise in England but in the colonies. The 
imperialistic spirit had gained the ascendency in the latter long 
before it succeeded in making much of an impression upon 
English politics. The colonial policy of England was still con-
ducted according to the tenets of the Manchester School. At the 
same time her foreign policy was marked by a careful withdrawal 
from active participation in European politics. There was little 
occasion for international complications. As late as 1899 Lord 
Salisbury declared that the relations of Germany and Great 
Britain were" everything we could desire." But colonial suspi-
cions of Germany's imperial designs had already spread to Eng-
land, and with the growth of colonial influence in English politics 
that suspicion became more strongly confirmed. The Kruger 
telegram and acrid German criticisms of the Boer war added fuel 
to the flames. Many of the leaders of English public opinion 
came to believe that Germany harboured designs on the British 
Empire, and the Foreign Office began to assume a more critical 
attitude towards Wilhelmstrasse. 
But the political controversy was destined to take on a more 
materialistic character. The economic rivalry of the two coun-
tries added to the flame of international suspicion and mis-
understanding. A part of the commercial interests of the two 
countries were quick to play upon national sentiment to further 
their own selfish interests. It was no mere accident that the 
tariff-reform agitation and anti-German sentiment developed 
side by side in England. They were, in truth, but different 
phases of the same movement. Protection, according to its 
wont, robed itself in the false garb of patriotism and set forth to 
sow discord between the two peoples. The big armament firms 
in turn played and preyed upon the fears of the pUblic. The 
history of this agitation reflects no little discredit upon a consider-
able portion of the Conservative press and party. The peace prop-
aganda of the Liberal leaders checked for a time this campaign 
of malevolence, but the refusal of the German Government to 
agree to any of their proposals for a limitation of armaments 
defeated their well-intentioned efforts to bring about a happy 
solution of the points of issue. In both countries the seed of 
national hostility had been well scattered. The asperities of the 
COLONIAL ASPECTS OF THE WAR 247 
press, the agitations of the Navy Leagues, the programmes of the 
Admiralty and War Departments were the immediate result of 
this insidious campaigu. And Europe is now reaping the full 
harvest. 
For the beginning of this international antagonism Great 
Britain cannot be held primarily responsible. She did not 
afford the occasion for the first offence. The aggressive policy of 
Germany, as we have seen, stirred up a hostile spirit in the 
colonies and this reacted strongly on English public opinion. 
The foreign policy of England had in truth become a colonial 
policy. It was in reality, as Lord Rosebery declared, "more 
dictated from the extremities of the Empire than from London 
itself." But for the subsequent development of England's 
foreign policy, for the entangling European alliance, for the 
policy of the political isolation of Germany, for the Moroccan 
imbroglio, the British Government must bear its full share of 
responsibility. For many years Great Britain had been content 
to be an imperial power; she had consciously withdrawn from 
continental politics. She did not object to the ascendellcy of 
Germany on land, provided that she ruled the seas. But with 
the advent of Germany as a colonial power England resumed her 
former place in the councils of Europe; Germany had apparently 
challenged her position as an imperial power. England replied 
by questioning her rival's supremacy in Europe. Not that 
England essayed to be a great European power, but that she 
endeavoured to adjust or readjust the balance of European 
power so as to secure a free hand for carrying out her imperial 
policy. The policies of both nations were avowedly patriotic 
but at the same time essentially selfish. A spirit of exaggerated 
nationalism has dictated the policies of the chancelleries of 
Europe. And this, after all, as far as the chief European 
states are concerned, is the deep underlying cause of the present 
war. 
The British colonies have not gone into the war blindly or 
from compulsion but of their own free will. They were kept 
well informed as to the course of negotiations and they heartily 
approved of the policy of Sir Edward Grey. The war is of their 
own malcing as far as their participation is concerned. The 
English Government has not the right to levy a single man or 
impose a single penny of taxation in any of the self-governing 
colonies for the support of the war. The Canadian, Australian, 
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and Indian troops can be employed outside their respective 
dominions only at the instance of these governments themselves. 
In fact, in both fiscal and military matters the self-governing 
colonies enjoy what is practically an independent status. And 
even in respect to foreign affairs they have developed in some 
cases a distinct policy of their own, as for example in respect to 
relations with Japan. They carryon their negotiations through 
their own officials and determine for themselves what imperial 
treaties shall be made operative within their territories. Accord-
ing to the conventions of the constitution neither the imperial 
government nor parliament can bind them without their own 
consent. "Daughter am I in my mother's house, but mistress in 
myown.'1 
In joining in the war, the colonies have no desire to wreck 
the German Empire, to impair its civilization or subject it to an 
alien race. They seek but the removal of the dark threatening 
cloud of militarism which has hung over them since 1884. The 
war to them is a defensive war, a war for the preservation not of 
the British Empire alone but of the constitutional principles of 
national liberty on which that empire is based. It is a struggle 
not of rival races or of competing civilizations, but of contrasted 
forms of government, of political ideals, of democracy versus 
autocracy. And in that issue they feel that they have as great 
an interest as England herself. They are convinced of the 
justice of their cause. Out of this war they hope to see a better 
and more liberal-minded empire arise. 
"Nobody doubts," said a prominent Hindu, U whatever may be the tem-
porary difficulties we shall emerge victorious out of this terrible war~ and 
we Indians feel that it will open a new chapter in our history, and if I may say 
so, in the history of England, brighter and nobler than any in the past, for now 
and henceforth, England, India, and the oversea dominions will, stand and 
grow together in bonds sanctified on the field of battle." 
But more than that, they hope to see, in the words of Gladstone, 
.. the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing 
idea of European politics." In place of the rule of force the 
colonies would set up the ideals of the gospel of universal peace, 
a peace not dependent upon the supremacy of the single state 
or on the uncertain balancing of selfish interests, but broad-
based upon the public opinion of the whole community of 
nations. 
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In this spirit of liberalism the colonies appeal with the same 
high confidence as does Gennany, to the judgment of history. 
Their prayer is the prayer of Ajax in the Battle of the Ships: 
". And now deliver thou, 0 Father Zeus, the sons of the Achaians from 
under this cloud and make clear sky above them and grant to their eyes to see; 
that so if it be thy will to slay tbem, thou slay them in the light.· Thus spoke 
he and Father Zeus looked down upon him in his sore travail. And forthwith 
he smote the mist and drove away the murk from Heaven and the whole face 
of the battle was made plain." 
c. D. ALLIN. 
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